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NOTE
GREGORIAN v. IZVESTIA: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
ELUSIVE SOVIET DEFENDANT
In Gregorian v. Izvestia 1, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court ruling which set aside a de-
fault judgement for libel against the Soviet newspaper Izvestia2 and
reversed the district court's decision allowing a default judgment to
stand for breach of contract against Soviet trading organizations3 . The
court found that under the Foreign Sovereignty Immunity Act"
("FSIA"), the court did not have jurisdiction over Izvestia and the li-
bel claim 5. The court vacated the default judgement on the breach of
contract claim' under Rule 60(b)(6) which allows a court to vacate a
judgment for "any other reason justifying relief . . . ."' This left Gre-
gorian, a California businessman, with no recourse for his injuries.
This note examines the role FSIA played in isolating the Soviet
Union from liability for its actions. Although FSIA carves out specific
cases where foreign entities are not granted immunity8 , the wording of
1. 871 F.2d 1515 (9th Cir. 1989).
2. Id. at 1522.
3. Id.
4. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Act of October 21, 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified at 28 U.S.C. 1330; 1332(a)(2)-1332(a)(4);
1391(F); 1441(D); 1602-1611 (1976).
5. Gregorian, 871 F.2d at 1521-1522.
6. Id. at 1522.
7. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b):
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his
legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly dis-
covered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to
move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party;
(4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or dis-
charged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based had been reversed or other-
wise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospec-
tive application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from operation of the
judgment.
8. See infra notes 86-91 and accompanying text for exceptions to sovereign
immunity.
(75)
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FSIA leaves room for judicial interpretation.' The Gregorian court fol-
lowed established case law and legislative interpretation in reaching its
decision. 10 This note suggests that other interpretations are possible
which afford some protection for the unsuspecting businessman dealing
with the Soviets.
With Mikhail Gorbachev's recent push for perestroika"l and glas-
nost", more Americans will have business contacts with the Soviets
and expose themselves to possible liabilities incurred in theses transac-
tions. If courts continue to follow the Ninth Circuit's reasoning, Ameri-
can businessmen who deal with the Soviets will have no recourse for
commercial wrongdoing by the Soviets.
I. THE CASE
A. Facts
In 1970, Raphael Gregorian, an American of Russian decent'", and
his company, California International Trade Corporation ("CIT"), be-
gan exporting medical and laboratory equipment to the Soviet Union,1
acting as a broker or sales representative.' 5 In 1982, the Soviet Minis-
try of Foreign Trade awarded the status of "accreditation" to CIT.' 6
This honor allowed CIT to have an office in Moscow and was evidence
9. In the Legislative History of FSIA, the committee noted that "[tihe courts
would have a great deal of latitude in determining what is a 'commercial activity.' "
H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 16, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 6604, 6615 [hereinafter House Report]. See infra notes 107-127 and
accompanying text for judicial interpretations of "direct effect" and "commercial
activities."
10. See infra notes 52-76 for a discussion of the court's analysis.
11. Perestroika refers to Gorbachev's proposed "restructuring" of the Soviet
Union. Gorbachev described perestroika as "a policy of accelerating the country's so-
cial and economic progress and renewing all spheres of life." M. GORBACHEV, PER-
ESTROIKA NEW THINKING FOR OUR COUNTRY AND THE WORLD, II (1987).
12. Glasnost (publicity) refers to Gorbachev's recent push for openness in the So-
viet Union.
13. Gregorian was born in Volgograd (formerly Stalingrad) and spoke fluent Rus-
sian. Hyatt, The CEO Who Came in from the Cold, INC. Jan., 1986 at 87. [hereinafter
Hyatt].
14. Gregorian, 871 F.2d at 1517.
15. Gregorian v. Izvestia, 658 F. Supp. 1224 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
16. Gregorian, 871 F.2d at 1517. As of 1982, CIT was the smallest company ac-
credited to operate in the Soviet Union. About 25 companies were accredited, including
IBM and E.I. Du Pont de Nemours and Co. "The Soviets usually required minimum
sales of $40 million to qualify for accreditation, but they waived the rule because of
[CIT's] high-quality equipment." Hyatt, supra note 13, at 90.
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of the Soviets' high regard for Mr. Gregorian.17
From 1982-1984, there were several billing disputes between Mr.
Gregorian and the Soviets involving three sets of equipment.' Mr.
Gregorian claimed that he shipped the equipment to the Soviet Union
pursuant to an oral contract with various customers, the Ministry of
Foreign Trade, the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics and V/O
Medexport and V/O Licensintorg (Soviet foreign trade organizations);
and that the Soviets installed the equipment in their hospitals.'" Mr.
Gregorian also claimed that the Soviets have not paid for any of the
equipment shipped after 1982.20 The Soviets denied any contractual
relationship."
On November 10, 1984 the Ministry of Foreign Trade revoked
Mr. Gregorian's accreditation. 2 On November 18, 1984, the Soviets
published an article in Izvestia, a Soviet newspaper, entitled "Duplici-
tous Negotiator: A Story About a U.S. Firm and an Abuse of Trust."23
In the article, the Soviets accused Mr. Gregorian of bribery, smuggling
and unethical business practices as well as accusing Mr. Gregorian of
espionage.24
B. Lower Courts
After unsuccessful attempts to resolve the disputes with the Sovi-
ets, 5 Mr. Gregorian filed suit in United States District Court for the
Central District of California on January 1, 1985 alleging libel, breach
of contract and civil conspiracy. He named Izvestia, the USSR, V/O
Licensintorg, V/O Medexport, and the USSR Ministry of Foreign
Trade as defendants. 6 Mr. Gregorian charged that the Soviets revoked





21. Gregorian, 871 F.2d at 1517.
22. Id. Gregorian received a telex from the Protocol Administration of the Soviet
Ministry of Foreign Trade stating that "the Ministry of Foreign Trade has decided to
discontinue the activities of the firm's representatives in the Soviet." Gregorian had 90
days to leave the Soviet Union. Hyatt, supra note 13, at 90.
23. Gregorian, at 1517.
24. Id.
25. Gregorian, 658 F.Supp. at 1226. After receiving the telex, Gregorian went to
Switzerland and offered to meet with the Russians. Gregorian's lawyer went to Moscow
to try to reinstate Gregorian's accreditation but was unsuccessful. See Hyatt, supra
note 13, at 90, 92.
26. Gregorian, 658 F. Supp. at 1226-1227.
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paying for the medical equipment which CIT shipped to the Soviet
Union. 7
The United States State Department served process on the Soviet
defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C §1608(a).28 On May 31, 1985, the
United States Embassy in Moscow sent copies of the complaint and
summons to the Soviet defendants. 9 The State Department also en-
closed a note advising the defendants of FSIA and that the defendants
were to respond within sixty days or risk default under United States
law.3 0 Under the direction of the Soviet government, the defendants
rejected service and returned the documents, claiming that in accor-
dance with the "principle of sovereign equality of state, . . . the Soviet
state and its organs enjoys immunity from the jurisdiction of foreign
courts."3 1
On July 31, 1985, the district court entered default judgments for
four of the contract claims and the libel claim, awarding damages on
the contract claims in the amount of $163,165.17 and on the libel
claim in the amount of $250,000.00.32
On October 14, 1986, a U.S. Magistrate issued an order giving
Mr. Gregorian the right to attach and execute against property in the
United State owned by the Soviet defendants. 3 Mr. Gregorian seized a
Cyrillic typewriter from a U.S. correspondent for Izvestia. 4 On No-
vember 20, 1986, the Magistrate issued a second order allowing them
to execute against funds held under the Bank of Foreign Trade for V/
0 Medexport.36 On November 21, 1986, counsel for V/O Medexport
and V/O Licensintorg made an appearance. 6 The U.S. Marshal then
executed a writ on two bank accounts of the Bank of Foreign Trade at
BankAmerica International in New York City.37 Bank of America
withdrew funds to satisfy the judgment and notified Moscow that their
accounts had been attached. 38 V/O Medexport and V/0 Licensintorg
filed motions to dismiss the case, vacate the judgment and stay the exe-




31. Gregorian, 658 F. Supp. at 1226-1227, quoting Embassy of the U.S.A. at
Moscow, Note No. 925, May 31, 1985.





37. Gregorian, 658 F. Supp. at 1227.
38. Id.
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cution.39 On December 4, 1986, the court issued an order to stay the
execution of judgement and froze the funds in the BankAmerica." °
After the appearance of the Soviet defendants, negotiations took
place between the Soviets and the State Department, who encouraged
the Soviets to appear."1 The United States, as an amicus curiae, agreed
with the Soviets' motion to set aside the default judgment to consider
the Soviets' defenses.' 2
In April 1987, the district court granted the Soviet's motion to set
aside the libel claim, holding that the claims against the Soviet newspa-
per lacked subject matter jurisdiction under FSIA.'3
The court denied defendant's (V/O Medexport's) 60(b)(4) motion
to set aside the default judgment for the breach of contract claims,
however, holding that the court had personal and subject matter juris-
diction under FSIA." The court found subject matter jurisdiction for
the plaintiff's contract claim under the "direct effect" clause of FSIA
which finds jurisdiction over the foreign defendant when there is a com-
mercial act outside the United States which has a direct effect inside
the United States.' 5 The court applied due process standards to FSIA
in deciding the personal jurisdiction issue. 46 The district court found
that the Soviet trading organizations were not separate juridical enti-
ties from the USSR.' 7 This would enable the plaintiffs to use contacts
between the USSR and the United States as a whole as a way to gain
personal jurisdiction over the trade organizations.' 8
Finally, the district court found that the court could not vacate the
judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) because the Soviets had been culpable
in failing to respond to the original action.'" Rule 60(b)(6) allows a
court to vacate a judgement "for any other reason justifying re-
lief. . .. ,,50 Both sides appealed the district court's decision."1
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Gregorian, 871 F.2d at 1518.
42. Id.
43. Gregorian, 871 F.2d at 1520.
44. Gregorian, 658 F. Supp. at 1234-1236.
45. Id. at 1236.
46. Id. at 1234-1236.
47. Id. at 1236.
48. Id.
49. Gregorian, 658 F. Supp. at 1237-1239.
50. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6).
51. Gregorian, 871 F.2d at 1516.
19901
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C. Court of Appeals
1. Libel Claim
The court of appeals affirmed the district court's ruling to set aside
the default judgment and dismiss the libel claim for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. 52 First, the court found that the district court cor-
rectly granted Mr. Gregorian's request for a rule 54(b) 53 certification
which allowed Mr. Gregorian to immediately appeal the dismissal of
their libel claim." Rule 54(b) allows a court to enter a final judgment
on one or more claims when "there is no reason for delay and upon an
express direction for the entry of judgment."55 In accessing the correct-
ness of a 54(b) ruling, the court of appeals took into account other
claims which may present similar issues that need to be reviewed as a
single claim5" and considered the trial court's assessment of the "equi-
ties" involved, such as prejudice and delay. 57 The court of appeals
should then only overturn its decision if the court's decision was clearly
unreasonable.5 8 The court of appeals found that the district court did
not abuse its discretion in finding that the unadjudicated claims of
emotional distress and civil conspiracy were distinct and separate from
52. Id. at 1522.
53. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) states:
When more than one claim for relief is present in an action . . .the court may
direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all the
claims .... only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for
delay and upon an express direction for entry of judgment. In the absence of such
determination and direction, any other order or form of decision, however desig-
nated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims . . . shall not terminate the
action as to any of the claims ...and the order or other form of decision is not
subject to revisions at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the
claims . ..
54. Gregorian, 871 F.2d at 1518.
55. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
56. Gregorian, 871 F.2d at 1518-1520. In Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Elec-
tric Company, 446 U.S. 1 (1980), the Supreme Court stated the standard that a court
must apply when considering Rule 54(b) motions:
The court of appeals must ...scrutinize the district court's evaluation of such
factors as the interrelationship of the claims so as to prevent piecemeal appeals in
cases which should be reviewed only as single units. But once such judicial con-
cerns have been met, the discretionary judgment of the district court should be
given substantial deference . . . .The reviewing court should disturb the trial
court's assessment of the equities only if it can say that the judge's conclusions
were clearly unreasonable.
Curtiss- Wright Corp., 446 U.S. at 10.
57. Gregorian, 871 F.2d at 1519-1520.
58. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 446 U.S. at 10.
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the libel claim." Thus, the libel claim was properly before the court of
appeals.60
The court of appeals found that under FSIA, the court did not
have subject matter jurisdiction for the libel claim.6" The court rejected
Mr. Gregorian's assertion that the "commercial activity" exception to
sovereign immunity applied to the libel claim. 2 The plaintiff claimed
that the purpose of the libel was commercial; the Soviets were using
the libel to avoid commercial obligations.6" The court of appeals looked
to the nature of the Izvestia article and found that it was governmen-
tal. 4 The court relied on the fact that the newspaper was a government
organ which expressed the official opinions of the Soviet Union.65 Thus,
the court of appeals found that the district court correctly dismissed
the libel claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.66
2. Breach of Contract Claim
The court of appeals found that the district court erroneously de-
nied the defendant's 60(b)(6) motion to vacate the default judgment.67
59. Gregorian, 871 F.2d at 1520.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1522.
62. Id. at 1521. The commercial activities exception to sovereign immunity is
codified at 28 U.S.C. 1605(a):
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the
United States or of the States in any case -
(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the
United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States
in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an
act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial
activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the
United States ...
28 U.S.C. 1605(a) (1982).
63. Gregorian, 871 F.2d at 1521.
64. Id. FSIA defines commercial activities as:
• . . either a regular course or commercial conduct or a particular commercial
transaction or act. The commercial character of an activity shall be determined by
reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction of act,
rather than by reference to its purpose.
28 U.S.C. 1603(c) (1982).
65. Gregorian, 871 F.2d at 1521. The court in Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press
Agency, 443 F.Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) addressed the question of libel against So-
viet publications. The court characterized Izvestia as an "'organ of the Soviets of
Working People's Deputies' published by 'The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the
U.S.S.R.'" Yessenin-Volpin, 443 F. Supp. at 856.
66. Gregorian, 871 F.2d at 1522.
67. Id.
1990]
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The court of appeals vacated the judgment and remanded the case to a
lower court for proceedings to decide whether there was subject matter
and personal jurisdiction over the breach of contract claim. 68 The court
went on to provide ample guidance for interpreting a 60(b)(6) request
and applying FSIA to the breach of contracts claim.6"
a. Rule 60(b)(6) Motion
The court of appeals examined policy considerations involved in
granting a 60(b)(6) 70 motion and found that the district court had
abused its discretion by denying the motion." The appellate court also
found that the defendants' failure to comply with United States law
(FSIA) did not constitute culpable behavior. 2 The court held that a
foreign sovereign defendant's reasonable belief that it is immune from
a suit under FSIA is not culpable conduct that would prevent a
60(b)(6) motion to set a aside a default judgment. 71
b. Rule 60(b)(4) Motion
The district court denied the defendants' Rule 60(b)(4) motion to
vacate a default judgment for the breach of contract claim, claiming
that FSIA provided subject matter and personal jurisdiction over the
defendants.7 4 Since the court of appeals reversed the 60(b)(6) motion,
it did not have to rule on the 60(b)(4) motion.7 5 The court did recog-
nize that on remand, the lower court may be faced with the issues of
personal and subject matter jurisdiction under FSIA and set forth
guidelines to help the lower court.76
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1526-1530.
70. Id. at 1523-1526. The court looked at several policy consideration. Rule 60(b)
is remedial and must be applied liberally. Meadows v. Dominican Republic, 817 F.2d
517, 521 (9th Cir. 1987). Default judgments are disfavored; cases should be decided on
their merits if possible. Pena v. Seguros La Comercial, S.A., 770 F.2d 811, 814 (9th
Cir. 1985). The court should consider whether the defendant seeks timely relief from a
judgment and whether the defendant had a meritorious defense. Meadows, 817 F.2d at
521. The court should also take into account whether the plaintiff would be prejudiced
if the judgment were set aside and if the defendant's actions were culpable. Id. See
infra notes 103-106 and accompanying text for discussion of Rule 60(b)(6).
71. Gregorian, 871 F.2d at 1526.
72. Id. at 1523-1526. See infra notes 152-157 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of culpable conduct.
73. Id. at 1525.
74. Gregorian, 658 F. Supp. at 1234.
75. Gregorian, 871 F.2d at 1526.
76. Id. at 1526-1530. See also supra notes 67-75 and accompanying text for the
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II. STATUTES
A. FSIA and Sovereign Immunity
Under the sovereign immunity doctrine, a foreign state may be
immune from the jurisdiction of another state's court. The United
States Supreme Court first recognized the doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity in The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon.7 In The Schooner Ex-
change, the court granted immunity to a foreign state which had not
consented implicitly or explicitly to the suit.78 Gradually, the judicial
system began to rely on the State Department for guidance in granting
immunity to foreign states.
In 1952, the State Department adopted a restrictive theory of sov-
ereign immunity.80 Under the restrictive theory, sovereign immunity is
only available to a foreign state if the case is based on the state's public
acts (jure imperii).8 1 If commercial activity (jure gestionis) is the basis
of the suit, the foreign state cannot be granted immunity. This frame-
work posed problems in that it required a political body, the State De-
partment, to apply legal standards though it was not equipped to hear
witnesses, take evidence or have appellate review.83
The Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act was adopted in 1976, codi-
fying the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity.84 FSIA was enacted
in response to the increasing number of Americans who were coming
into contact with foreign states. " FSIA ensures that United States
citizens have access to the United States judicial system to bring a
claim against a foreign defendant.
court's analysis of FSIA as it applies to the breach of contract claim.
77. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1982).
78. Id.
79. House Report, supra note 9, at 8, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 6606. The practice of relying on the State Department for the deter-
mination of sovereign immunity can be found in Ex Parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943)
and in Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945).
80. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor to the Secretary of State, to
Phillip B. Perlman, Acting Attorney General of the United States (May 19, 1952),
reprinted in 26 Sep't St. Bull. 984 (1952) [hereinafter Tate Letter]. See House Re-
port, supra note 9, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6607.
81. House Report, supra note 9, at 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 6605.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 6608.
84. Id. at 6605. Foreign courts also apply the restrictive theory against the United
States in suits against the United States. Id.
85. Id.
1990]
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The Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act provides a foreign state with
immunity from jurisdiction in United States courts unless the cause of
actions falls into one of the exceptions enumerated in FSIA. First, a
foreign state cannot raise sovereign immunity if it has explicitly or im-
plicitly waived its immunity.8 6 The second major exception to immunity
is for commercial activities and is contained in three clauses.87 A for-
eign state is not immune from jurisdiction in U.S. courts if the cause of
action is based on commercial activity performed within the United
States or if the action is based on an act performed in the United
States connected to the foreign state's commercial activity outside the
United States. 88 Also, a foreign state does not receive immunity if the
cause of action is based on a commercial act occurring outside the
United States but having a direct effect in the United States.89 Non-
commercial exceptions to FSIA also include cause of actions involving
personal injury or death and damage to or loss of property occurring in
the United States caused by the tortious conduct or omission of a for-
eign state or its employee acting within scope of his official employ-
ment.90 Finally, foreign states are granted immunity for claims "arising
out of malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepre-
sentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights."91
FSIA offered little guidance in determining commercial activity,
giving the courts "a great deal of latitude" in determining commercial
activity.92 Commercial activity is defined in paragraph (c) of section
1603 as including a broad range of activities from "a regular course of
commercial conduct" to "a particular commercial aggression or act."93
To determine if an activity is commercial, the court looks at the nature
of the activity to see if it is governmental or public, which would pre-
clude jurisdiction.9 4
86. 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(1) (1982).
87. 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(2) (1982).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(5) (1982).
91. 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(5)(B) (1982).
92. House Report, supra note 9, at 16, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 6615.
93. See supra note 64. Commercial activities include "the carrying on of a com-
mercial enterprise such as a mining extraction company, an airline or a state trading
corporation," as well as "a single contract... House Report, supra note 9, reprinted
in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6614-6615.
94. Id. at 6615. See also Artz, The Noncorporate Plaintiff: Hostages to the Gor-
dian Knot of the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 1976, 54 CIN. L. REV. 907
(1986) for a discussion of commercial activity as it relates to corporate and non-corpo-
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Section 1330(b)95 provides for personal jurisdiction over a foreign
defendant when the court has the power to hear the claim under sec-
tion 1330(a), i.e. there is subject matter jurisdiction over the claim
under FSIA.9 6 Service must be made pursuant to section 1608 of
FSIA. Also, minimum contacts between the foreign state and the
United States are required, as well as adequate notice. 7
FSIA was enacted to ensure that the court would decide the ques-
tion of sovereign immunity free from the constraints of foreign policy. 8
The passage of FSIA removed the determination of immunity from the
executive branch and gave it to the judicial branch, thus ensuring that
immunity considerations would be based on legal grounds, not on for-
eign policy considerations. 9 Further, other countries followed the prac-
tice of having the courts be responsible for all foreign sovereignty deci-
sions.' 0 FSIA also gave the courts a way to obtain in personam
jurisdiction over foreign defendants' 01 and a way to afford relief to a
plaintiff who has a judgment against a foreign defendant. 10 2
B. 60(b)(6)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) allows a court to set aside a
judgment in certain situations. Rule 60(b)(6) enables a court to vacate
a judgment "for any reason justifying relief . . ."'I' This clause ad-
dresses situations not specifically covered in the first five clauses 0 4, and
does not address a substantive standard of review.'05 In granting a Rule
60(b) motion, courts have broad discretionary powers which have been
defined by later case law.' 06
rate plaintiffs.
95. 28 U.S.C. 1330(b) (1982). This section provides a federal long arm provision
over foreign states.
96. House Report, supra note 9, at 13, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 6612.
97. Id.
98. House Report, supra note 9, at 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws at 6612.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See 28 U.S.C. 1330(b) (1982).
102. House Report, supra note 9, at 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 6612.
103. See supra note 7.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See supra note 70.
1990]
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III. CASE LAW
A. FSIA and Commercial Activities
Although FSIA codified earlier law regarding sovereign immunity,
a large body of case law has developed to interpret the more general
phrases of the statute, resulting in differing interpretations. The phrase
"commercial activities" has been interpreted by the courts to mean, as
indicated in the legislative history, the nature of the act."0 7
In Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agencys 08 the plaintiff
brought an action for libel against Tass (Telegraph Agency of the
USSR) 0 9, Novosti Press Agency, "an information agency of Soviet
public organizations," ' 10 and The Daily World, a newspaper published
by the Communist Party of the United States. The court held that
TASS and Novosti were entitled to sovereign immunity as both organi-
zations did not engage in commercial activity."' The court rejected
plaintiff's argument that even though libel is specifically mentioned as
not conferring jurisdiction under section 1605(a)(5)(B), the court could
still find jurisdiction under the commercial activities exceptions found
in section 1605(a)(2).1 2 Specifically, the court found that the publica-
tions in question were publications of the USSR itself which repre-
sented "official commentary of the Soviet government," and were not
made "in connection with a contract or other arrangement with a non-
governmental agency, which activity would be found commercial under
most circumstances." ' 13
The third clause of section 1605(a)(2) grants subject matter juris-
diction over claims that are based on acts connected with the commer-
cial activity of a foreign state that occur outside 'the United States but
have a direct effect in the United States. 1 4 The third clause is the sub-
ject of litigation and commentary to determine the meaning of "direct
effect in the United States."' 1 In Zendan v. Kingdom of Saudi Ara-
107. See supra note 94.
108. 443 F. Supp. 849 (1978).
109. Id. at 852.
110. Id. The articles were published in Sowjetunion Heute, Krasnaya Zvezda
(Red Star), Izvestia and Sovetskaya Rossiya (Soviet Russia). Id. at 856.
111. Yessenin-Uolpin, 443 F.Supp. at 856.
112. Id. at 8855-856.
113. Id. at 856.
114. See supra notes 87-94 and accompanying text for a discussion of the com-
mercial activities exception to FSIA.
115. See Note, Effects Jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
and the Due Process Clause, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 474 (1980); Note, Direct Effect Ju-
risdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 13 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L.
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bia, the court held that a direct effect must be "substantial and foresee-
able."11 In Zendan, the court found that something legally significant
must occur in the in United States to achieve a direct effect such as a
bank refusing to pay on a letter of credit, transferring money, or incur-
ring a debt." 7 According to the court's reasoning in Zendan, however,
a financial loss incurred by the plaintiff in the United States is not
enough to constitute a direct effect.' s
The court in Texas Trading v. Federal Republic of Nigeria ad-
dressed the issue of direct effects in the United States in relation to
corporate plaintiffs. 19 Texas Trading involved breach of contract ac-
tions against Nigeria and its bank by American businesses. 120 The
court pointed out that a corporation is intangible and can only suffer
financial loss. 2 ' Thus, the court found the test to apply direct effect
standard to corporate plaintiffs was whether the corporation had suf-
fered direct financial loss.' In Texas Trading, a direct effect in the
United States occurred when the defendants breached contracts which
provided that money owed to the plaintiffs would be collected in the
United States.'23
The court in Meadows v. Dominican Republic, a case involving a
breach of contract claim, found subject matter jurisdiction under
FSIA. 124 The court determined that there were direct effects on the
plaintiff in the United States. 2 5 The defendant, the Dominican Repub-
lic and one of its executive agencies, failed to pay the plaintiff, an
American businessman, his commission for obtaining a loan for the
plaintiff.'28 The Dominican Republic's contract with the plaintiffs to
pay their commission in the United States constituted a direct effect in
the United States. 127
& POL. 571 (1981).
116. 849 F.2d 1511, 1514 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
117. Id. at 1515.
118. Id.
119. 647 F.2d 300 (2nd Cir. 1981).
120. Id. at 302.
121. Id. at 312. The court commented that "Unlike a natural person, a corporate
entity is intangible; it cannot be burned or crushed. It can only suffer financial loss."
Id.
122. Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 312.
123. Id.
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B. Personal Jurisdiction and FSIA
Once subject matter jurisdiction has been established under FSIA,
the court must determine if asserting personal jurisdiction over the for-
eign defendants meets due process requirements. Courts have applied
due process standards to establish personal jurisdiction under FSIA.2 8
The court must first determine if the defendant has "certain minimum
contacts" with the forum state so that "maintenance of the suit does
not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."12 9
The court also looks to whether the foreign state has purposefully
availed itself to the privilege of doing business in the United States 
3 0
Texas Trading considered the problem of personal jurisdiction and
FSIA.' 3' The court used the entire United States for establishing mini-
mum contacts, not just the forum state, 32 and noted that section 1608
provides for world wide service of process. 3 The court applied the pol-
icy justifications found in Hanson v. Deckla T , concluding that if a
foreign sovereign invokes the "benefits and protections of (American)
law," then the foreign defendant would expect to be brought into an
American court.' 35 Texas Trading also stressed the forum state's inter-
est in providing redress for its citizens against foreign defendants which
FSIA provides. 136
C. Culpable Conduct Under 60(b)(6)
Rule 60(b)(6) provides that the court may vacate a judgment "for
any other reason justifying relief . ..,37 Rule 60(b)(6) offers no sub-
stantive guidance which has lead to much case law surrounding the
128. See House Report, supra note 9, at 13, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS at 6612. According to the House Report, there must be minimum
contacts between the forum state and the United States and adequate notice before
personal jurisdiction can exist.
129. International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 66 S. Ct. 154, 158 (1945),
quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
130. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,253 (1958).
131. Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 313-315. Meadows also considered the question
of personal jurisdiction, relying on Texas Trading's analysis. Meadows, 817 F.2d at
523.
132. Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 314.
133. 28 U.S.C. 1608 (1982).
134. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
135. Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 314, quoting Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253.
136. Texas Trading, at 315. See also McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.,
355 U.S. 220, 231 (1957), where the Supreme Court noted that "[tihe forum has a
"manifest interest in providing effective means of redress for its residents..
137. See supra note 7.
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rule. Courts have limited the broad discretionary power of the courts to
several policy considerations. First, rule 60(b)(6) is remedial in nature
and must be applied liberally. 13 8 Second, default judgments are disfa-
vored and should be decided on their merits whenever possible.139 The
court should also take into account whether the defendant has a meri-
torious defense °, i.e. if the facts the defend alleges were true, he
would prevail.'" Also, the defendant must ask for relief in a timely
manner. 42 The court may consider whether granting a Rule 60(b)(6)
motion will prejudice the plaintiff 43 and whether the defendant's cul-
pable behavior lead to the default.144 Thus, the court can deny a Rule
60(b)(6) motion if the plaintiff would be prejudiced by the court set-
ting aside the judgement, if the defendant has no meritorious defense
or if the defendant's culpable conduct caused the default.143
The court in Jackson v. People's Republic of China maintained
that Rule 60(b)(6) offered relief that was "an extraordinary remedy,
which may be invoked only upon a showing of exceptional circum-
stances."' 48 In Jackson, a class action was filed against the People's
Republic of China ("PRC") for payment of bearer bonds in default,
which had been issued by the Imperial Chinese Government in 1911 .14
The appellate court upheld the district court's decision to grant the
PRC's motion to set aside the default judgment under 60(b)(6) when
the defendant claimed absolute immunity. 48 The court also held that
extraordinary circumstances existed in the present case which justified
granting the defendant's 60(b)(6) motion to dismiss.' 49 The court relied
on the fact that the default judgment against the PRC was "a signifi-
cant issue in bilateral United States/China relations."' 150 The court also
found that the defendants had a meritorious defense: the PRC was un-
familiar with United States judicial practice and the PRC believed that
international law did not require them to appear.'
138. Falk v. Allen, 739 F.2d 461, 463 (9th Cir. 1984).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Gregorian, 658 F. Supp. at 1237.
142. Gregorian, 871 F.2d at 1523.
143. Falk, 739 F.2d at 463.
144. Id.
145. Gregorian, 871 F.2d at 1523.
146. 794 F.2d 1490, 1494 (11th Cir. 1988).
147. Id. at 1491-1492.
148. Id. at 1494.
149. Id. at 1495.
150. Id.
151. Jackson, 794 F.2d at 1496.
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In Pena, the Ninth Circuit defined culpable conduct as whether
the defendant had actual or constructive notice of the filing of the ac-
tion and failed to respond.15 Meadows followed the rules set forth in
Pena.'53 In Meadows, the plaintiff sent the defendants a copy of the
complaint by mail but received no receipt.16 4 The plaintiff also sent a
letter to the Department of State, requesting them to serve process on
the defendants and the defendants still failed to respond.' 55 In Pena,
the court also found culpable conduct. 151 In Pena, the defendant failed
to keep a correct address on file with the state insurance department
which resulted in the notice of action being sent to the wrong
address.157
IV. ANALYSIS
The Gregorian court, ruling in favor of the Soviet defendant, left
the American businessman no remedy for the wrongs caused by the
Soviet government and its agencies.' 58 By finding no subject matter ju-
risdiction over the libel claim, the court precluded Mr. Gregorian from
recovering for the injuries caused by the Izvestia article. The court set
aside the default judgment on the breach of contract claim, remanding
the case to the lower court for further proceedings.'" Although the
appellate court followed prior case law in its rulings, the court man-
aged to leave Mr. Gregorian, an American citizen, without a remedy
for the extensive damage caused by the Soviets. On remand, the lower
court could find the contract claim within one of the enumerated excep-
tions to sovereign immunity in FSIA, giving the court jurisdiction over
the claim. 160
A. Libel Claim
The court found that the libel claim fell outside the commercial
activity exception of FSIA, leaving Mr. Gregorian with no redress for
152. Pena V. Seguros La Comercial, S.A. 770 F.2d 811, 815 (9th Cir. 1985).
153. Meadows, 817 F.2d at 521.
154. Id. at 520.
155. Id.
156. Pena, 770 F.2d at 815.
157. Id.
158. See supra notes 52-72 and accompanying text for the court's treatment of
the issues involved.
159. See supra note 68.
160. See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text for exceptions to sovereign
immunity embodied in FSIA.
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the financial loss caused by Izvestia's false accusations.161 Mr. Grego-
rian argued that jurisdiction was proper under all three clauses of the
commercial activity section of FSIA. 12 First, the plaintiff claimed that
the commercial activity was Izvestia's sales in the United States and
abroad. 6 3 The direct effects were the contract losses suffered by Mr.
Gregorian in the United States. 6 Mr. Gregorian also argued that sec-
tion 1605(a)(5)(B) only grants immunity to noncommercial torts (li-
bel) and does not cover commercial torts (trade libel).'
The court rejected Mr. Gregorian's argument that activities are to
be classified by their purpose, not by their nature.'66 According to the
court's analysis, the plaintiff claimed that "the alleged libel was pub-
lished with the purpose of injuring plaintiffs by avoiding commercial
obligations."(emphasis in original) 67 The Court contended that the na-
ture of the article was governmental. 68 The court also relied on Yes-
senin-Volpin which held that Izvestia is the "official commentary of the
Soviet government.' 69 The court relied on the fact that Izvestia is an
"organ of the Soviets of Working People's Deputies, and is published
by the Presidium if the Supreme Soviet of the USSR."' 70 Due to the
governmental nature of Izvestia, the court held that the activity was
governmental, not commercial and therefore, no subject matter juris-
diction existed under FSIA.171
The Soviet Union is a socialist state controlled by the communist
party. All publications are controlled by the state in one form or an-
other; consequently, all publications "belong" to the people. Since all
publications are censored or regulated by the government, there is no
free speech in the Soviet Union. 172 Therefore, any article in a Soviet
161. Gregorian, 871 F.2d at 1521-1522.




166. Gregorian, 871 F.2d at 1521.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Gregorian, 871 F.2d at 1522, quoting Yessinen-Volpin, 443 F.Supp. at 853.
170. Gregorian, 871 F.2d at 1522. The court relied on amicus curiae briefs by the
United States, which described Izvestia as ". . .[a] voice of an official Soviet agency,
[and] determination of its contents can be carried out only by a government entity;
thus, publishing a particular article in Izvestia is a sovereign, governmental function."
Gregorian, 871 F.2d at 1522, quoting Statement of Interest of the United States at 24.
171. Gregorian, 871 F.2d at 1522.
172. In response to heavy government censorship, underground dissident publica-
tions such as "Samizdat" flourished. There is, based on the recent developments in the
Soviet Union, an opportunity for some decline in government censorship, however, it is
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publication, no matter how much it may seem to be commercial in na-
ture, will be considered "governmental," or official commentary of the
Soviet Union. Under FSIA, this gives the Soviet Union carte blanche
to publish any article, no matter how libelous, and claim that it is gov-
ernmental, protecting them from a suit under FSIA.
In Mr. Gregorian's situation, there is a strong case for trade libel,
a commercial activity, which would then allow a U.S. court to exert
subject matter jurisdiction over the defendants under the "direct ef-
fect" clause of section 1605(a)(2). The libel directly caused sever finan-
cial hardship to Mr. Gregorian's company. Mr. Gregorian suffered a
near collapse of his business and had to lay off many workers including
taking himself off the payroll. " '
There are many possible motivations behind the Soviet's printing
the libelous, false statement. Mr. Gregorian could have been an exam-
ple for the increasing number of American businessmen who will be
dealing with the Soviet Union in the future.17"4 The Soviets may have
wanted to issue a warning to other businessmen who might be tempted
to exploit the Soviets for personal gain or engage in espionage. It is not
uncommon for the Soviet Union to arbitrarily deport an American
when a Soviet is reprimanded in the United States for espionage or to
use scare tactics to ensure that in the future, Americans will not be
tempted to commit some for of commercial espionage. Alternatively,
Mr. Gregorian may have been a part of the Soviet Union's budget
slashing. 175 When Mr. Gregorian lost his accreditation, the Soviet
Union signed a contract with the company that would enable the Sovi-
ets to purchase the equipment directly, without the added cost of a
middleman."' All these explanations point to the fact that the state-
ments were not grounded in fact.
In light of the recent thawing between the Soviets and Americans,
we can expect increased contacts with the Soviets. With Gorbachev's
economic reforms, the Soviets will be looking to the West for innova-
tive "capitalist" ventures to stimulate a sluggish economy. If the courts
allow the Soviets to use libel to ruin an American businessman, the
courts are leaving the Soviets with an easy way to get rid of business
when they wish to pursue a more profitable opportunity. Unless the
courts carve out some sort of trade libel exception in the FSIA for com-
unlikely that the Soviet government will give up control of these vital organs of
propaganda.





munist or socialist countries with state owned publications, the United
States is leaving its citizens unprotected and alone.
B. Breach of Contract Claim
The court of appeals found that the district court erroneously de-
nied the Soviet defendant's rule 60(b)(6) motion to set aside the de-
fault judgment.177 Since the court remanded the case on the basis of
the 60(b)(6) motion, the court did not have to consider whether FSIA
gave the courts jurisdiction over the breach of contract claim. 178 The
court did, however, provide its analysis of FSIA in relation to the
breach of contract claims.1 79 While the Soviets may have deserved their
day in court to defend themselves, the lower court should at least find
jurisdiction under FSIA for the breach of contract claims and allow
Mr. Gregorian to recover for the unpaid equipment.
1. Rule 60(b)(6) Motion
The district court denied the defendant's Rule 60(b)(6) motion to
set aside the judgment "for any other reason justifying relief . . ." be-
cause it found the defendant's nonappearance culpable. 180 The appel-
late court found that the defendant's actions were not culpable and re-
versed the district court's ruling. 81
The court took into account several policy considerations in decid-
ing the defendant's Rule 60(b)(6) motion. It noted that Rule 60(b) was
remedial in nature and should be liberally applied. 82 The court recog-
nized that default judgments are disfavored as cases that should be
tried on their merits. 8 The court noted that a court can deny a Rule
60(b)(6) motion if the plaintiff would be prejudiced by the setting aside
the judgment, if the defendant has no meritorious defense or if the de-
fendant's culpable conduct caused the default.1 8 4
The court of appeals agreed with the district court that there
would be no significant prejudice to the plaintiff if the judgment was
vacated and that the defendants had a meritorious defense in that if
177. Gregorian, 871 F.2d at 1522.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1526-1530.
180. Gregorian, 658 F. Supp. at 1238.
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the facts the defendants allege are true, they will prevail.'8 " The appel-
late court disagreed with the district court as to the question of culpa-
ble conduct. The court found that the defendant's conduct was not cul-
pable, entitling them to relief under Rule 60(b)(6).186 Plaintiff relied
on Meadows and claimed that the defendants' behavior was culpable in
that the defendants had notice of the action but failed to appear. 87
The court distinguished the present case by noting that since the Soviet
Government instructed the defendants not to appear, it was not a deci-
sion made by the defendants. 88 The court held that the defendants'
nonappearance did not constitute culpable behavior if based on the So-
viet government's instructions to act within the Soviet's laws of immu-
nity.189 Also, the court claimed that the defendants acted on a reasona-
ble belief that they were not subject to jurisdiction."'0 The court relied
on Jackson and found that a foreign defendant's nonappearance, based
on a reasonable belief that it is immune from a suit under FSIA, is not
culpable behavior under Rule 60(b)(6). 191 In Jackson, the court consid-
ered the foreign policy implications of a default judgment and found
that the PRC's nonappearance was not a bar to a rule 60(b)(6)
motion.192
Even though the court relied on Jackson to reach its decision in
finding culpable conduct 1 3 , the court in Jackson did not base its hold-
ing on culpable conduct. Instead, the Jackson court balanced all the
policy interests involved and looked at the foreign policy implications of
its decision."' The court in Gregorian claimed to be following Jackson
by finding culpable conduct but they neglected to consider the foreign
policy implications of their decision. A fear of upsetting the improving
relations between the USSR and United States, however, could have
influenced the Court's decision that the defendants' actions were not
culpable. While improving relations between the USSR and the United
States is an important endeavor, this should not be done at the expense
of a businessman who deserves redress for this wrongs. Further, FSIA
was enacted expressly to take the determination of immunity out of the
185. Id. See also Gregorian, 658 F. Supp. at 1237.
186. Gregorian, 871 F.2d at 1523.
187. Id. at 1524.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1525.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Jackson, 794 F.2d at 1496.
193. Gregorian, 871 F.2d at 1525.
194. Jackson, 794 F.2d at 1496.
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hands of the executive branch, influenced by foreign policy considera-
tions, and place it into the hands of the judiciary which would base its
decisions on legal standards.'95
It is possible, though, to find culpable behavior on the part of the
Soviets which would then preclude them from relief under 60(b)(6).
First, the Soviet Union regularly trades and does business with West-
ern nations. It is or should be aware of the business practices of West-
ern nations. It is unfair for the courts to allow the Soviets special privi-
leges, such as claiming deliberate disregard of the laws of the United
States to be non-culpable actions. It is absurd to think that a super-
power would not be aware of the theory of restrictive immunity in the
marketplace and honor it accordingly. Assuming that the Soviets are
aware of the theory behind FSIA, a blatant disregard for United States
law is culpable conduct.
2. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Under FSIA
The court does not reach a conclusion concerning personal and
subject matter jurisdiction under FSIA.196 The court did provide guide-
lines for a lower court to follow in making these determinations. " ' The
court considered the district court's finding of subject matter jurisdic-
tion under the third clause of FSIA which grants jurisdiction when a
commercial act based outside the United States has a direct effect in-
side the United States. 98 First, the court interpreted "direct effect" to
be substantial and foreseeable.1 99 To establish a direct effect, something
"legally significant" must occur in the United States."' Relying on
Zendan, the court found that mere financial loss by a plaintiff as a
result of actions abroad does not constitute a direct effect.21
The court, applying the above considerations, suggested that the
plaintiff has alleged facts which may lead to subject matter jurisdic-
tion. 2 The defendant visited California with regard to the contracts
under dispute and conducted negotiations regarding the equipment. 03
The contract stipulated for payments to be made in California. The
court does point out that these facts are in dispute and will be resolved
195. See supra note 99.
196. Gregorian, 871 F.2d at 1528.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1526-1527.
199. See supra note 116.
200. See supra note 117.
201. See supra note 118.
202. Gregorian, 871 F.2d at 1527.
203. Id.
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by a district court.' 4
Under the third clause of FSIA which grants jurisdiction for com-
mercial activity outside the United States with a direct effect in the
United States, the court could easily find subject matter jurisdiction.
The defendants breached a contract with the plaintiff which has a di-
rect effect on the plaintiff in the United States, causing him to lose
resources and much of his business. The breach resulted in American
and Soviet banks refusing to transfer funds into the plaintiff's account.
Although the court relied on Zendan and the stipulation that mere fi-
nancial loss does not constitute a direct effect, the court in Texas Trad-
ing held that a direct effect can be found with a corporate plaintiff
when the defendant's actions cause financial loss.20 5 Under Texas
Trading, the claim would fall within the commercial activity exception
as the plaintiff suffered financial loss as a result of the defendant's
actions.
3. Personal Jurisdiction under FSIA
Once the court established subject matter jurisdiction under
FSIA, the court must then determine if personal jurisdiction exists.
The appellate court in Gregorian recognized the need to satisfy the
minimum contacts due process standard found in International Shoe °.2 0
The court then considered if the defendant could be considered part of
the Soviet State in establishing minimum contacts necessary to gain
personal jurisdiction.
The district court concluded that the defendant trade organiza-
tions were part of the Soviet State which is present throughout the
world in the form of diplomatic and trade missions. including the So-
viet Embassy in Washington D.C. and the consulate in San Fran-
cisco. 207 The district court also viewed the banks of the Soviet Trade
Organizations as agents of the defendants. 28 The defendants argue
that the defendant Medexport is a separate entity from the Soviet state
and only the defendant's contracts are relevant.2 0 9 The appellate court
found that for purposes of establishing personal jurisdiction, the de-
fendant trading organization is a separate juridical entity from the So-
204. Id. at 1528.
205. See supra note 122.
206. Gregorian, 871 F.2d at 1529.
207. Gregorian, 658 F. Supp. at 1236.
208. Id. at 1235.
209. Gregorian, 871 F.2d at 1529. The defendants produced a Soviet lawyer who
attested to the fact that the defendant trade organization was a separate entity from
the Soviet state. Id. at 1530.
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viet State and the banks, restricting the court to consider on remand
only the defendants contacts when establishing personal jurisdiction.21
In deciding the libel question, the court ruled that the Soviet news-
paper Izvestia was an organ of the Soviet state and incapable of com-
mercial activity.21' For personal jurisdiction purposes, the court deter-
mined that the foreign trade organization is not a part of the Soviet
State.2"2 The court of appeals is clearly ignorant of the Soviet Union
and its economy. Until very recently, there was no free enterprise in the
Soviet Union. Every store, hotel, enterprise, and organization is a func-
tion of the state. As is the case with publications in the Soviet Union,
commercial enterprises are entirely state run and can be considered a
part of the state for all intensive purposes. The district court recognized
this aspect of Soviet life, stating that "U.S. courts recognize the Soviet
State's monopoly over foreign trade . . . this Court concomitantly
views defendant trade organizations, both generally and specifically
• ..as integral parts of that State which enjoys representation through
diplomatic and trade mission around the world." 1' It is odd that the
court of appeals was so willing to accept Izvestia as a part of the Soviet
State but rejected the trade organization as an agent of the State.
V. CONCLUSION
With the recent improvements of USSR-US relations and the
push toward a more capitalist economy in the Soviet Union, American
businessmen will inevitably have more contacts with their Soviet coun-
terparts. As the number of transactions with the Soviet Union grow,
the potential for legal disputes will also increase. The judicial system
must be willing to provide a forum for resolution of disputes that may
arise between the American plaintiff and his Soviet defendant.
Although FSIA was enacted in response to the increasing number
of contacts between Americans and foreigners, FSIA does not always
provide protection from a Soviet defendant as was the case with Mr.
Gregorian. The court in Gregorian continually used FSIA to the detri-
ment of the American plaintiff. If FSIA is to operate to confer jurisdic-
tion on Soviet defendants, the courts will have to recognize the Socialist
nature of the Soviet State. If courts interpret FSIA under the direction
of the Ninth Circuit, it is doubtful that an American plaintiff will ever
have his day in court opposing a Soviet defendant. As long as the So-
210. Gregorian, 871 F.2d at 1530.
211. Id. at 1522.
212. Id. at 1530.
213. Gregorian, 658 F. Supp. at 1236.
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viet Union wishes to do business with American businessmen, the So-
viet Union must be prepared to subject itself to the American judicial
system.
Jennifer Lasko
